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Abstract—This paper studies the distributed coordination of
large populations of thermostatically controlled loads (TCLs).
It is assumed that each TCL operates in an integrated en-
ergy/frequency response market and reacts to broadcast prices in
order to minimize its energy cost and, at the same time, maximize
its revenues from frequency response. A mean field game is used
to model the competing interactions between the TCLs, quantify
their impact on the system unit commitment and characterize
the desired market equilibrium solution. This approach is then
compared with a no-flexibility case in a 2030 scenario of the
GB system, assessing the potential benefits of different types of
flexible price-responsive TCLs in terms of cost reduction for the
individual customers and for the overall system.
I. INTRODUCTION
One of the defining element of the power system transition
towards the smart grid paradigm is an increased flexibility
on the demand side. It is envisioned that, in the near future,
customers will have the possibility to become “prosumers”
and use new technologies such as EVs and smart appliances
to actively participate to system operation, exchanging energy
and providing ancillary services to the grid [1]. The potential
benefits of this innovative setup would include reduced costs
for the system (for example through a more efficient integra-
tion of renewables) and lower electricity tariffs for the users.
Thermostatically-controlled loads are considered as one of
the key technologies to achieve this paradigm shift and a
substantial amount of research has investigated system-level
coordination of TCLs in multiple contexts, such as energy
arbitrage [2] or frequency response (FR) [3].
In particular, competitive paradigms have drawn increasing
attention for their capability of preserving customers’ privacy
and maximizing their local objectives. With these approaches,
each TCL is modelled as a self-interested entity that responds
to price signals and determines its operational strategy in order
to strike the best trade-off between the electricity cost and the
comfort of its individual user. Two main paradigms are usually
considered for competitive coordination of flexible loads:
1) Market-based [4], [5], [6]: the loads respond au-
tonomously to market prices. These are generated through
the resolution of a unit commitment/generation schedul-
ing problem that accounts for the impact of flexible
demand.
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2) Game-theoretic [7], [8], [9]: a more analytical framework
is adopted and the interactions between loads are de-
scribed by a competitive game. Using simplified pricing
structures, convergence and optimality of the proposed
control schemes are ensured.
This paper aims at bridging the gap between these two research
streams to provide new insights on the potential value of
TCLs’ flexibility in a competitive setting. As in previous
market-based studies, the analysis considers a unit commit-
ment problem with inertia-dependent frequency constraints to
characterize system operation, generating relevant price signals
that account for multiple generation technologies. At the same
time, a game-theoretic formulation is used to analytically
characterize the market solution. Differently from previous
approaches, a mean field game (MFG) is used to describe the
price elasticity of demand and characterize the self-interested
choices of the single devices, expressing the resulting market
equilibrium as a fixed point of two coupled partial differential
equations (PDEs).
With respect to previous applications of MFG in a power
system context (e.g for storage [10] or electric vehicles [11])
this paper considers additional relevant elements. On the basis
of the framework presented in [12], the proposed formulation
envisages TCLs that provide ancillary services in addition to
pursuing energy-cost minimization, responding to meaningful
price signals generated by a unit commitment problem.
This mathematical formulation is used to quantify the
potential value of TCLs flexibility. The energy costs of flex-
ible TCLs operating in an integrated energy/FR market are
compared with the business-as-usual, no-flexibility scenario
in which the operation of the thermostatic loads is purely
driven by their internal temperature. This analysis has been
made for eight distinct types of TCLs, considering different
penetration rates of flexible device and thus evaluating the
impact of competition on the potential cost savings of the
devices. Simulation results are presented and discussed for
a 2030 scenario of the GB system with large penetration of
flexible TCLs and renewables.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows: Section
II introduces the considered unit commitment problem and
models the population of flexible TCLs. The MFG formulation
is presented in Section III and numerically solved in Section
IV for a case study of the GB system. Finally, Section V
contains some conclusive remarks.
II. MODELLING
The proposed modelling framework can be described by
two distinct but interconnected elements, represented in Fig.
1. The population of TCLs responds to two price signals p
and ρ and its overall behaviour can be summarised by two
quantities UTCL and RTCL. In turn, the resolution of a unit
commitment (UC) problem takes into account UTCL and RTCL
to determine the generation scheduling decisions and return
the price signals p and ρ . Each of the two modelling blocks
is now described in detail.
Fig. 1. Interactions between TCLs and unit commitment.
A. Unit Commitment
The UC problem determines the scheduling of the different
generation units (in terms of energy and FR) in order to
minimize the short-term operating costs of the system. The
result of the UC corresponds to the outcome of a centralized
market mechanism for energy and FR, if one assumes inelastic
demand and perfect competition [13]. Within this framework,
the signals p and ρ , which are used to coordinate the TCLs,
correspond respectively to the prices of energy and FR.
To simplify the analysis, a Linear Programming formulation
has been chosen for the UC problem. It is assumed that, for
each generation technology τ , the capacity of the individual
generation unit is significantly smaller than the total installed
capacity Gmaxτ . As a result, the commitment decisions can
be expressed through a continuous variable Hτ(t) ∈ [0,1],
which represents the percentage of Gmaxτ (t) that is on-line
at time t. This approach significantly reduces computational
times with respect to binary UC and MILP UC. At the same
time, it accounts for the fundamental system-level scheduling
requirements, i.e. generation-demand balancing and allocation
of sufficient frequency-related control to deal with fault events.
For consistency with the mean field game characterization
of the TCLs’ behaviour, a continuous-time formulation is
proposed for the UC problem, which is solved over the time
interval [0,T ]⊂ R. Moreover, inter-temporal constraints such
as generation ramping have been neglected, allowing to solve
the UC problem on an instant-by-instant basis.
To formally characterize the UC problem, let Nτ denote the
number of generation technologies available in the system.
The on-line generation (as fraction of total installed/available
capacity), the generated power and the allocated response of
technology τ at time t are denoted by Hτ(t), Gτ(t) and Rτ(t),
respectively. This notation can be extended to consider the
vectors H(t) = [H1(t), . . . ,HNτ (t)], G(t) = [G1(t), . . . ,GNτ (t)]
and R(t) = [R1(t), . . . ,RNτ (t)]. If one denotes by U
TCL(t) and
RTCL(t) the total power consumption and allocated response
of the TCL population, the UC at time t can be expressed as
the following optimization problem:
ϕ(UTCL(t),RTCL(t)) =
min
H(t),G(t),R(t)
Nτ
∑
τ=1
c1,τ ·Hτ(t)Gmaxτ (t)+ c2,τ ·Gτ(t)+ c3,τ ·G2τ(t)
(1)
with c1,τ [£/MWh] as no-load cost, c2,τ [£/MWh] and c3,τ
[£/MW2h] as production costs. The objective function (1)
corresponds to total generation costs per unit of time and is
minimized under the following constraints:
Nτ
∑
τ=1
Gτ(t)−U¯(t)−UTCL(t) = 0 (2a)
0≤Hτ(t)≤ 1 ∀τ ∈{1, . . . ,Nτ} (2b)
Rτ(t)≤ rτ ·Hτ(t) ·Gmaxτ (t) ∀τ ∈ {1, . . . ,Nτ} (2c)
Rτ(t)≤ sτ · [Hτ(t) ·Gmaxτ (t)−Gτ(t)] ∀τ ∈ {1, . . . ,Nτ} (2d)
µ ·rτ ·Hτ(t) ·Gmaxτ (t)≤Gτ(t) ∀τ ∈{1, . . . ,Nτ} (2e)
2∆GL · trcf · td− t2rcf · Rˆ(t)−4∆ frcf · td · Hˆ(t)≤ 0 (2f)
q¯(t)− Hˆ(t) · Rˆ(t)≤ 0 (2g)
∆GL−D[U¯(t)+UTCL(t)−RTCL(t)]∆ fmaxqss − Rˆ(t)≤ 0 (2h)
Condition (2a) balances supply with demand, which is given
by the system inelastic demand U¯(t) plus the total power
consumption UTCL(t) of the TCLs. The inequalities in (2b)
follow from the definition of Hτ as percentage of on-line
generation. The response Rτ allocated by each technology τ is
bounded by the headroom rτ ·Hτ(t) ·Gmaxτ (t) in (2c) and by the
slope sτ linking the FR with the dispatch level in (2d). In order
to prevent trivial solutions with large FR and zero generation,
constraint (2e) imposes that the generation dispatch Gτ(t) must
be µ times higher than the maximum available FR.
The constraints (2f)-(2h) ensure secure frequency deviations
following an unexpected generation loss ∆GL. In particular, as
demonstrated in [14]:
• Constraint (2f): RoCoF condition ∆ f (trcf)≥ ∆ frcf.
• Constraint (2g): frequency nadir condition ∆ fnad ≥ ∆ fmax
(see [14] for the chosen linearization technique).
• Constraint (2h): quasi steady-state frequency condition
∆ f (t→ ∞)≥ ∆ fmaxqss .
For compactness of notation, we have denoted as Rˆ =
∑Nττ=1Rτ(t)+R
TCL(t) the aggregate system FR and by Hˆ(t) =
∑Nττ=1
hτ ·Hτ ·Gmaxτ −hL∆GL
f0
the post-fault inertial response (IR).
Relevant quantities in the above expressions include the nom-
inal frequency f0, the load damping coefficient D, the inertia
constant hτ of technology τ and the inertia hL of the infeed
generation loss (no longer supporting the system).
The solution ϕ of the UC problem (1)-(2) has been charac-
terized as a minimized cost, parametrized by UTCL and RTCL.
These quantities depend on the operation of the TCLs and do
not represent decision variables under the chosen paradigm.
The sensitivity of the optimal solution with respect to these
parameters can be expressed by the following two quantities:
p(t) =
∂ϕ(U,R)
∂U
∣∣∣∣U=UTCL(t)
R=RTCL(t)
ρ(t) =
∂ϕ(U,R)
∂R
∣∣∣∣U=UTCL(t)
R=RTCL(t)
(3)
Note that p can be interpreted as the marginal cost of
accommodating an additional unit of power demand and it
corresponds to the electricity price. Similarly, ρ represents
the marginal saving of allocating one less unit of FR (which
would be provided by the TCLs instead). As a result, ρ is
the availability fee awarded to the TCLs for FR allocation.
Consistently with Fig. 1, these price signals are broadcast to
the TCLs, which respond by minimizing their associated costs.
B. Thermostatically controlled loads
The individual TCL is described by the dynamics of its
internal temperature T :
T˙ (t) = f(T (t),u(t)) =− 1
σ
(T (t)−TOFF +ζu(t)) (4a)
where σ is the TCL thermal time constant, TOFF is the ambient
temperature and ζ incorporates the physical model of heat
exchange (with To f f −ζu(t) indicating the asymptotic cooling
temperature). An initial temperature T (0) = T˜ is considered.
Each TCL can control its instantaneous power consumption
u(t), which can take two values: u(t) = uON (if TCL is ON)
and u(t) = 0 (if TCL is OFF).
The dynamic modelling is extended through an additional
state variable I(t) = T (t)− T˜ that keeps track of the total
temperature variation of the TCL over the time interval [0, t].
The evolution in time of I is straightforward to characterize:
I˙(t) = T˙ (t) (5a) I(0) = 0. (5b)
The quantity I(t) allows to distinguish multiple TCLs that,
at some time t, have reached the same temperature T (t) from
different initial values T˜ . This can ensure anti-synchronization
of the coordination strategy, as the I tracking cost term
presented at the end of this section can diversify the behaviour
of the TCLs with equal temperatures.
Under the proposed modelling framework, each TCL can
contribute to FR. At any time t, the maximum amount of
FR r(t) that can be provided by a single TCL will depend
on its power consumption u(t) and internal temperature T (t),
according to the following relationship:
r(T (t),u(t)) = λ (T (t)) ·u(t). (6)
The individual TCL can provide FR only if it is ON (u(t) =
uON > 0) and it is therefore available to reduce its power
consumption in case of a frequency event. The decreasing
function λ : [TMIN,TMAX]→ [0,1] in (6) is a weighting term
that accounts for the current temperature of the TCL and
ensures that a potential FR provision (with the TCL being OFF
for some time and increasing its internal temperature) does not
lead to undesirable temperature values. For simplicity, in the
current analysis λ (T ) has been chosen as the linear function
λ (T ) = (T −TMAX)/(TMIN−TMAX).
An agent-based approach is now considered for the flexible
TCLs, which are modelled as selfish rational agents. They
autonomously determine their power consumption profile u in
response to the broadcast price signals p and ρ in order to
minimize their own individual cost J defined below:
J(u(·)) =
∫ tFIN
0
p(t) ·u(t)−ρ(t) · r(T (t),u(t))+
α(T (t)− T¯ )2+β (I(t)− I¯(t))2 dt+Ψ(I(tFIN)), (7)
subject to: T (t) ∈ [TMIN,TMAX] ∀t ∈ [0, tFIN] (8)
where TMIN and TMAX are the operational temperature bounds
of the considered TCL.
Each term in (7) is now described in detail:
• Electricity cost p(t) · u(t): instantaneous cost associated
to the power consumption u(t).
• Response revenue ρ(t) · r(T (t),u(t)): availability fee
awarded for FR provision. It corresponds to the product
of the response price ρ and the allocated FR r(T (t),u(t)).
• T tracking cost α(T (t)− T¯ )2: discomfort term that pe-
nalizes deviations from some target temperature T¯ .
• I tracking cost β (I(t)− I¯(t))2: quadratic cost for devia-
tions of state I from a target signal I¯(t). The purpose of
this term is to differentiate the behaviour of TCLs. Multi-
ple loads with equal temperatures T (t) but different initial
temperature T (0) = T˜ will adopt different strategies,
according to their different state variables I(t) = T (t)− T˜ .
This allows to avoid undesired synchronization in the
proposed coordination algorithm.
• Terminal cost Ψ(I(tFIN)): used to impose periodic con-
straints. For example, setting Ψ(I) = Λ · I2, the TCLs
are incentivized to have I(tFIN) = T (tFIN)− T˜ = 0 (equal
initial and final temperature).
III. MEAN FIELD GAME FORMULATION
As previously discussed, each TCL determines indepen-
dently its power consumption profile u(t) – and consequently
its allocated FR r(T (t),u(t)) – in order to minimize its cost
function J, on the basis of the prices p and ρ . By doing
so, the population of TCLs will impact the solution ϕ of the
UC problem in (1) through the aggregate quantities UTCL and
RTCL, thus modifying the prices p and ρ initially considered.
In other words, the TCLs are rational players that compete
between each other for power consumption (and FR provision)
at times with low prices p (and high prices ρ). The objective
of this section is to model these gaming interactions and
characterize an equilibrium solution where no TCL has interest
in unilaterally modifying its power consumption.
The optimal behaviour and dynamics of the TCLs are
described in a mean field game framework by two coupled
partial differential equations (PDEs). Denoted by L(t,u,T, I)
the argument of the integral in (7), we consider:
1) An HJB equation (integrated backward in time), describing
the value function associated to (7):
−Vt(t,T, I) = min
u∈{0,PON}
L(t,u,T, I)+(VT (t,T, I)+VI(t,T, I))f(T,u)
(9)
and the resulting optimal control of the TCLs:
uFF(t,T, I) = argmin
u∈{0,PON}
L(t,u,T, I)+(VT (t,T, I)+VI(t,T, I))f(T,u)
(10)
2) A transport equation which characterizes the evolution in
time of the state distribution m when uFF is applied:
mt(t,T, I) =−[m(t,T, I)f(t,uFF(t,T, I))]T
− [m(t,T, I)f(T,uFF(t,T, I))]I (11)
More details on the meaning of V and m and the derivation
of the PDEs can be found in [12].
The total power consumption and total allocated FR of the
TCLs can now be expressed as the weighted integral (over all
feasible state values) of the state distribution m, multiplied by
the optimal feedback control strategy uFF. Denoted by N the
number of considered devices, it holds:
UTCL(t) =UFF(t) = N
∫ IMAX
IMIN
∫ TMAX
TMIN
uFF(t,T, I)m(t,T, I)dT dI
(12a)
RTCL(t) = RFF(t) = N
∫ IMAX
IMIN
∫ TMAX
TMIN
r(T,uFF(t,T, I))m(t,T, I)dT dI.
(12b)
It should be emphasized that the PDEs describing the mean
field game are coupled: equation (11) depends on the value
function V in (9) through uFF in (10). Conversely, the solution
m of (11) affects through (12) the values of UTCL and RTCL
in (3), thus implicitly changing the price signals p and ρ
in (9). The desirable outcome of the coordination of the
flexible price-responsive TCLs can then be expressed as a fixed
point for equations (1) - (3), (9) - (12), which represents a
stable market equilibrium solution. All TCLs apply their best
response strategy in response to the price signals p and ρ and,
by doing so, their aggregate quantities UTCL and RTCL induce
those very same price signals in the unit commitment problem.
IV. ASSESSMENT OF FLEXIBILITY VALUE
In order to assess the value of TCLs’ flexibility, the stable
market equilibrium characterized in the previous section has
been calculated numerically and it is hereby referred to as
the Full-Flexibility (FF) scenario. This is compared with the
No-Flexibility (NF) scenario, where each TCL pursues normal
operation and switches ON and OFF according to its internal
temperature, with no impact from prices. In the rest of this
section, after a preliminary discussion on the characterization
and calculation of these scenarios, the results for the FF and
RF case are compared in a 2030 scenario of the GB system.
A. Full-Flexibility and No-Flexibility Scenarios
It is in general difficult to analytically calculate the solu-
tion in closed form for the system of equations (1) - (3),
(9) - (12), which corresponds to the FF scenario. For this
reason, numerical calculations have been performed, using an
iterative resolution scheme where these equations are solved
sequentially, using the solution of the previous integration as
a starting point for the resolution of the next equation. The
iterations are stopped when convergence to a fixed point is
obtained. Details on the numerical integration of the PDEs
(9)-(11) can be found in [12].
Regarding the NF scenario, it has been assumed that each
TCL operates as usual, switching OFF when the minimum
temperature TMIN is reached and switching ON at the maxi-
mum temperature TMAX. This can be characterized as:
T˙ (t) =
{
f(T (t),uON) if T˙ (t−)< 0,T (t)> TMIN
f(T (t),0) if T˙ (t−)> 0,T (t)< TMAX
(13)
We denote by uNF(t, T˜ ) the power consumption at time t of
the single TCL with initial temperature T (0) = T˜ when (13)
is considered in the NF scenario. Assuming the same initial
temperature distribution m0 considered in the FF scenario, the
total power consumption UTCL in the NF case is equal to:
UTCL(t) =UNF(t) = N
∫ TMAX
TMIN
uNF(t, T˜ ) ·m0(T˜ )dT˜. (14)
It should be emphasized that, in the present NF scenario,
the TCLs do not provide frequency response and therefore
RTCL(t) = RNF(t) = 0.
B. Case study
The FF and NF solutions have been compared in a typical
2030 scenario of the GB system, whose main generation
parameters are presented in Table I. Eight types of refrigeration
units across the domestic and commercial sectors have been
considered. For the domestic sector we distinguish refrigera-
tors, freezers and fridge-freezers, while within the commercial
domain we take into account bottle coolers (with glass doors),
refrigerators, freezers and two different multideck refrigerators
(open retail units). Representative parameters of the thermal
models are from [18]. For simulations, we considered N =
20 · 106 domestic fridge-freezers resulting in a steady state
power consumption U0 = 790 MW. The population size N
of other classes of TCLs was modified so as to ensure equal
steady-state power consumption in all cases. Heterogeneous
populations of TCLs will be considered in future work but it
is reasonable to assume that, if multiple types of TCLs are
considered at once, the result will be a combination of the
outcomes for the associated homogeneous scenarios, which
are presented below. The simulation parameters, including the
ones for the cost function J in (7), have been chosen as in [12].
Simulations have been performed in a MATLAB environment
and have required, for each TCL type, about 11 minutes on a
HP EliteBook laptop with an Intel(R) i5 CPU (2.60 GhZ) and
8 GB of RAM.
C. Simulation Results
The comparison between the FF and NF scenarios is initially
performed in Fig. 2 for the total profiles of TCL power
consumption UTCL (UFF and URF , respectively) and the total
FR allocation RTCL (RFF and RRF , respectively). Similarly, Fig.
3 represents the energy prices and the response availability fees
in the two scenarios, as obtained from (3). For compactness,
Fig. 2 and 3 focus on domestic fridge-freezers, where the
iterative algorithm for the FF case converges in 75 iterations.
Similar results are obtained for other classes of TCLs.
TABLE I
CHARACTERISTICS OF THERMAL AND WIND GENERATION
Nuclear CCGT OCGT Wind
Installed capacity Gmaxτ [MW] 10000 25000 20000 40000
No-load cost c1,τ [£/MWh] 0 16 17.5 0
Production cost c2,τ [£/MWh] 2 45 120 1
Production cost c3,τ [£/MW2h] 0.001 0.01 0.015 0.001
Constant of inertia hτ [s] 6 4 4 -
FR headroom rτ - 0.1 0.1 -
FR slope sτ - 0.4 0.5 -
Fig. 2. Total power consumption of the TCLs (black) and allocated response
(red), in the FF scenario (continuous lines) and in the NF case (dashed lines).
Fig. 3. Electricity price (black) and response availability price (red), in the
FF scenario (continuous lines) and in the NF case (dashed lines).
Some preliminary observation can be made regarding the
variations over time of the aggregate quantities UFF and RFF,
which are strictly related to the price signals pFF and ρFF.
During the early hours of the day, when demand is low, there
is high value in FR provision (ρFF is high) and the electricity
price pFF is low. As a result, most of the TCLs will tend to
consume power and participate to FR, leading to high values of
UFF and RFF. Conversely, when the prices change significantly
at about t = 6 h, the aggregate power consumption UFF and
allocated response RFF have a sharp decrease. The oscillations
of these quantities do not only depend on prices but are also
affected by the dynamics of the TCLs and by the sinusoidal
function chosen for the reference I¯ in (7). Conversely, in the
NF scenario, the behaviour of the TCLs is exclusively driven
by their internal temperature. The total power UNF in Fig.
2 remains approximatively constant and equal to the steady-
state power consumption U0. As previously mentioned, in the
present case the allocated response RNF is equal to zero.
The value of TCLs’ flexibility is now quantified by compar-
ing the daily energy costs sustained by single TCLs in both
cases. In the FF scenario, the cost JFF of the single load will
correspond to J in (7), evaluated at the optimal solution uFF,
with prices p= pFF and ρ = ρFF. In the NF scenario, the daily
cost will simply correspond to the following energy cost:
JNF =
∫ tFIN
0
pFF(t) ·uNF(t, T˜ )dt.
The percentage (daily) cost saving JS obtained in the FF case,
with JS = (JNF−JFF)/JNF×100, is represented in Fig. 4 as a
function of the initial temperature T˜ of the single device, for
the eight considered types of TCLs. It can be seen that, by
Fig. 4. Daily flexibility cost saving JS, for different types of individual TCLs,
as a function of their initial temperature.
exploiting their flexibility, the TCLs can reduce their energy
cost on average by 30% in the FF scenario. Note also the
higher savings for TCLs that have low initial temperature and
can therefore take full advantage of the first hours of the day,
with low electricity price pFF and high availability response
fee ρFF, as shown in Fig. 3. The effect of competition between
TCLs has also been quantified, assuming that only a fraction
of the TCLs population exploits its flexibility and participates
in the FF scenario. The resulting daily costs, represented for
simplicity only in the case T (0) = T˜ = TMIN are compared
in Fig. 5. As expected, competition between the loads has
the effect of decreasing the savings from flexibility: the more
TCLs shift power consumption at times with lower prices, the
more the aggregate demand and the prices will increase at
those times. Similarly, when more FR is allocated by a larger
number of TCLs, its value for the system will decrease and
the resulting availability fee ρ awarded for FR will be lower.
It is worth pointing out the different magnitude in costs faced
by single multidecks and bottle coolers compared to the other
appliances. This is due to their large duty cycles (≈ 0.6−0.7),
caused by a small range of operating temperatures and by
the poor level of insulation. The door of a bottle cooler
is made by glass (thermal conductivity higher than proper
insulation material) while multidecks are open retail units [15].
Moreover, the operating power consumption of a multideck 2
is 12 times higher than the domestic refrigerator (70 W).
Fig. 5. Daily cost savings for different percentages of flexible TCLs.
Finally, the FF and NF scenarios are compared in terms of
total system costs in Fig. 6. In the FF case, two different terms
have to be considered: the minimized generation costs ϕ (red
bars) plus the FR availability payment to the TCLs (blue bars),
equal to
∫
ρFF(t)RFF(t)dt. As expected, the flexibility of the
TCLs in the FF case allows to reduce the generation cost ϕ
by about 3%. A substantial 1% reduction is still obtained once
the FR availability payments are also considered.
V. CONCLUSIONS
A distributed price-based strategy is proposed for coor-
dination of flexible TCLs participating to an integrated en-
ergy/frequency response market. Under a competitive frame-
work, the loads minimize their operational cost according to
broadcast price signals, which are derived from the resolu-
tion of a unit commitment problem with inertia-dependent
frequency constraints. A mean field game is used to describe
the interactions between large populations of TCLs, charac-
terizing the market equilibrium as the fixed point solution of
coupled PDEs. The benefits from TCLs flexibility in terms of
reduced costs for the appliances and for the system have been
quantified through comparisons with a business-as-usual, no-
flexibility case, considering a 2030 scenario of the GB system.
Fig. 6. Daily system costs in the FF and NF case.
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